Main Research Agenda:
The wages and employment prospects of workers with different skills in a
world with differentiated jobs/occupations are a long-standing interest of
mine (see RED column or inaugural
lecture). In particular, how do various people change
occupations (see paper (7)), how can one re-design online job
search to incorporate advice that facilitates such changes ((1)
and VOX column), and how can we identify
sorting even though two-sided fixed effects are inappropriate (10)?
And what determines theoretically the sorting and wages in the presence of
large firms (2) and search frictions (12),
and how is this is affected by trade (4)?
Directed Search: A
second agenda reviewed in (20) explores whether workers direct
their job search towards jobs that post a higher pay: I have randomly varied
wage offers in the field (21), and studied the theoretical
foundations ((9) and (11)), its
effects on firm dynamics
(6), its consequences when workers
apply to multiple jobs ((14)
and (15)), its importance for mechanism
design (13), and whether firms can signal their
pay efficiently through cheap talk messages (5). Relatedly,
I considered how individuals can get better deals by following others, and –
more importantly - how firms reward those who are being followed (17).
Finally, I study how individuals adjust their partner search and sexual
behaviour depending on the risk of contracting HIV and how this affects the
epidemiological properties of disease transmission in equilibrium ((3)
Assortative Matching with Large Firms with Jan Eeckhout. Econometrica, 2018 86(1): 85-132..
We study a
matching model where heterogeneous firms can choose both how many and
which workers to hire, and illustrate consequences for firm-size and wage
In a quantitative equilibrium
model of sexual behaviour and HIV/AIDS transmission we study policies
that encourage long-term partnerships.
(6) Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market with Leo
Economic Review, 2015, Vol 105 (10), 3030-3060.
We propose a tractable search model
with heterogeneous multi-worker firms that compete for workers through
wage contracts, and investigate firm growth and business cycles.
(10) Identifying Sorting – In Theory with Jan Eeckhout, Review of
Economic Studies, 2011, Vol.
78 (3), 872-906.
employment data can identify the strength of sorting in standard search
models, though two-sided fixed effects are mis-specified
for any possible production function.
(12) Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition with Jan Eeckhout, Econometrica, 2010, Vol. 78(2), 539–574.
In search models
with price competition the sorting of heterogeneous buyers and sellers depends
on a simple trade-off between complementarities in output and in
(14) Efficiency of Simultaneous Search Journal of Political Economy, 2009, Vol. 117(5),
pp. 861- 913.
In a directed search model of wage
posting we allow workers to apply for multiple jobs and resolve the
allocation via a stable matching, which induces efficiency at all stages.
(16) A Model of Money with Multilateral Matching with Manolis Galenianos,
Journal of Monetary Economics,
2008, Vol. 55, pp. 1054-1066.
price dispersion and welfare in a monetary model with private
information, and show that inflation acts as a regressive tax even though
the rich hold more money.
(last updated: 2018)